Reserve Volatility and the Identification of Exchange Rate Regimes by Bleaney, Michael & Tian, Mo
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Reserve Volatility and the Identification of Exchange
Rate Regimes
Michael Bleaney1 & Mo Tian2
Accepted: 20 January 2021/
# The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Should exchange rate regime classifications be based purely on some measure of
exchange rate flexibility, or should such flexibility be judged in proportion to the
degree of exchange market pressure (EMP), as reflected in the behaviour of interna-
tional reserves? Some authors have claimed that the best approach to classifying
exchange rate regimes is to estimate to what extent EMP is absorbed in reserve
variability rather than exchange rate variability. Empirical evidence is presented on
the variability of reserves and exchange rates for 193 countries from 1980 to 2019.
Pegged regimes do not display any more reserve volatility than floats. In most regimes
there is a small but statistically significant positive correlation between reserve accu-
mulation and exchange rate appreciation in monthly data, but this effect is no stronger
in less flexible regimes, where intervention is expected to be greater. A flexibility index
is constructed, based on the ratio of exchange rate flexibility to reserve volatility, and is
compared to one based solely on exchange rate flexibility by investigating its confor-
mity with the IMF de facto classification. The flexibility index that takes reserves into
account does not improve the identification of pegs, but it helps to a limited extent to
distinguish free floats from managed floats.
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1 Introduction
Exchange rate classification schemes are usually based exclusively on the behaviour of
the exchange rate, at least in distinguishing some form of peg or band from a (possibly
managed) float (e.g. Bleaney and Tian 2017; Ilzetzki et al. 2017; Shambaugh 2004; see
Tavlas et al. 2008, for a survey). However, some authors have argued that such
classifications should take account of movements in international reserves as well as
in exchange rates. Frankel and Wei (2008, p. 7) condemn “…the folly of judging a
country’s exchange rate regime by looking simply at variation in the exchange rate”
and they go on to say: “One must focus on exchange rate variability relative to reserve
variability to gauge where a country sits on the spectrum of fixed to floating.” A similar
assertion of the necessity of a multi-dimensional approach to exchange rate regime
classification appears in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005, p.1608). An alternative
view to this, the rationale for which we discuss below, is that exchange rate dynamics
are sufficient to define a peg, but that reserve variability may be relevant in
distinguishing between floating exchange rates that are allowed to move more or less
freely from those that are tightly managed.
The argument for a multi-dimensional approach draws on the extensive literature on
exchange market pressure (Girton and Roper 1977; Weymark 1995), which recognises
that, in the event of excess demand (supply) for the domestic currency at the current
exchange rate, the government must either soak it up by accumulating (spending) reserves
or by reducing (raising) interest rates, or allow the currency to appreciate (depreciate).
Exchange market pressure in its most basic form is measured as the sum of the percentage
exchange rate appreciation (usually relative to the US dollar) and the percentage increase
in international reserves. This may be refined by some combination of (a) normalisation of
the components of EMP by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample
standard deviation and/or (b) adding in the change in interest rate differentials (foreign
minus domestic) (Aizenman et al. 2012; Aizenman and Binici 2016). Other approaches to
measuring EMP are discussed by Hall et al. (2013) and Patnaik et al. (2017). Factors that
may cause reserves to change in value without intervention, such as valuation changes and
interest payments, are implicitly treated as a minor problem, even though they may be a
significant distortion when intervention is rare (Patnaik et al. 2017, p. 65).
In this paper we address the question of whether reserve volatility is higher under
pegs, so that taking it into account helps us to distinguish pegs from floats. If reserve
volatility were not higher under pegs, then the observation that pegs tend to have a
lower ratio of exchange rate flexibility to reserve volatility would derive entirely from
the exchange rate element, and observers would be justified in ignoring reserve
volatility in identifying pegs. This issue has not usually been explicitly addressed;
instead, proponents of particular classification schemes have tended to answer it only
implicitly, by either taking some account of reserve volatility or ignoring it completely
in defining a peg (see Tavlas et al. 2008, for a survey). We find that reserve volatility is
not, in general, any greater under pegs, and therefore it does not help in distinguishing
pegs from floats. We then consider whether reserve volatility is of use in identifying
how tightly a float is managed.
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two surveys the criteria used to
distinguish a peg from a float in various exchange rate classification systems.
Section Three introduces the measure of exchange rate flexibility. Preliminary issues
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are discussed in Section Four, and our main results are presented in Section Five.
Section Six concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Regime Classifications
Most analyses of exchange rate regimes end up with a limited number of categories,
such as “Pegs”, “Intermediate Regimes” and “Floats”, which may or may not be further
disaggregated.
Some classifications use cluster analysis to identify combinations of low exchange
rate volatility and high reserve volatility (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005, 2016;
Strelchenko 2018). We might term this “the EMP approach” to exchange rate classi-
fication. The rationale for this is that governments dislike both exchange rate volatility
and reserve volatility, and as EMP increases, they will tend to choose a bit more of
each; but if governments vary considerably in the strength of their desires for stability
of exchange rates rather than reserves, in a cross-country sample there will be substan-
tial variation in the ratio of exchange rate volatility to reserve volatility, and this
information may be used to identify their preferences.
On the other hand, many exchange rate classification schemes ignore reserve vola-
tility altogether in defining a peg, without attracting widespread criticism. Shambaugh
(2004) defines a calendar year where there is a narrow range of variation of the exchange
rate against some anchor currency of ±2% in anymonth, or one where there is no change
at all in eleven of the twelve months, as a peg. Anything else is defined as a non-peg.
Obstfeld et al. (2010) allow for a softer category of peg as well, with permitted variation
of ±5%. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated in Ilzetzki et al. (2017), define a peg or a
band based on monthly exchange rate changes in rolling five-year periods. For pegs,
80% of the observations must fall in a range of ±1% (±5% for bands). The IMF
classification allows for basket pegs and crawling pegs and bands, and has evolved
over time (for details, see Habermeier et al. 2009), but it has always just been based on
exchange rate behaviour and has never included information about reserves.
One can justify this approach in EMP terms on the following grounds. Once a
government announces a peg with well-defined limits of variation, it creates a large
discontinuity in the marginal cost function of exchange rate volatility. So long as
exchange rate volatility is low enough to keep the rate within the limits, the cost of
any additional volatility is virtually zero, but as soon as those limits are breached, the
policy fails and the cost of any additional volatility becomes very large. Consequently
there is a sharp discontinuity in the marginal cost function of exchange rate volatility,
which has the effect that over a wide range of levels of EMP, extra EMP is almost
entirely absorbed in reserve volatility in order to keep exchange rate volatility below
this threshold. If EMP is only relatively rarely large enough to cause a parity change,
most pegs will be characterised by low exchange rate volatility but highly variable
reserve volatility.1 In other words the basic premise of the EMP approach – that
1 For evidence of the skewed distribution of estimates of EMP in the cases of particular currencies, with large
absolute values being relatively rare, see for example Hall et al. (2013, Figs 1–3) or Patnaik et al. (2017,
Fig. 1). Two reasons why EMP is rarely high could be: (1) that many pegs have high credibility; and (2) even
without this, speculators face a co-ordination problem in judging when an attack might be successful, and may
therefore be hesitant to incur the costs of attacking a currency even when they regard it as misaligned.
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governments wish to trade off exchange rate volatility against reserve volatility – may
be correct, but the discontinuity in the marginal cost function associated with an
exchange rate peg renders reserve volatility unhelpful in identifying a peg. By the
same token, however, if we consider a floating exchange rate, there is no such
discontinuity, and a greater preference for exchange rate stability should be reflected
in greater reserve volatility (or other measures designed to manage the exchange rate).
Therefore reserve volatility may well be useful in distinguishing tightly managed floats
from ones that are very loosely managed, if at all.
3 A Measure of Exchange Rate Flexibility
To compare an exchange rate classification system based purely on exchange rates with
one that also uses data on reserves, a continuous measure of exchange rate flexibility is
required. Bleaney and Tian (2017) suggest one that allows for all types of pegs (basket
pegs, crawling pegs) and for the occasional parity change, as does the IMF classifica-
tion. Their method is based on a regression similar to that previously used by Frankel
and Wei (1995) and Slavov (2013) to identify the basket of anchor currencies for a
pegged regime. The principle is that the movement of any currency X against a
numeraire currency N will track closely the movement of other currencies A, B, C
etc. against N if X is pegged to one or a weighted average of these currencies, so that
this regression will be characterised by a low root mean square error (RMSE). If
currency X is floating, the fit of this regression will be much poorer. Consequently
this RMSE may be regarded as an indicator of exchange rate flexibility. End-of-month
observations are used to generate a flexibility measure for each calendar year, with the
Swiss franc as numeraire (Bleaney and Tian 2017) or, in the further analysis of Bleaney
and Tian (2020), with the Japanese yen as numeraire. The flexibility index is designed
to be comprehensive, in that it caters for a single parity change with the exchange rate
pegged before and after the change, and for crawling pegs as well as horizontal pegs.
The sample consists of 193 countries over the years 1980 to 2019.
Since the number of degrees of freedom in the regression is limited when only
twelve observations are used, there is an issue of whether the accuracy of the measure
can be improved by extending the number of months, although there is a trade-off here
with the increased risk of a distortion of the measure by a regime change occurring
during the period. For the sake of robustness, we present results for 18-month and 24-
month regressions as well.
Although Bleaney and Tian (2017) have suggested an RMSE of below 0.01 as a
suitable criterion for a peg, the majority of pegs are much tighter than this, with an
RMSE of less than 0.001, which we label “Tight Pegs”. We examine whether there are
any systematic differences between Tight Pegs and Loose Pegs (i.e. those with an
RMSE between 0.001 and 0.01); in particular we show that Tight Pegs are virtually
100% single-currency pegs, whereas Loose Pegs are not.
The analysis here is based on using the Japanese yen as the numeraire. The potential
anchor currencies that we consider are the US dollar and the euro, but with others added
in particular cases as listed in Bleaney and Tian (2017, p. 304). Up to 1998, when the
euro had not yet been created, we use the German mark and the French franc instead.
The regression relates exchange rate movements of currency i against the chosen
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numeraire currency N (in this case the Japanese yen) to movements of potential anchor
currencies against N:
ΔlnE i;Nð Þt ¼ aþ bΔlnE USD;Nð Þt þ cΔlnE EUR;Nð Þt þ ut ð1Þ
where USD is the US dollar, EUR is the euro, E(i, N) is the number of units of currency
i per yen (so an increase represents a depreciation of currency i), and Δ is the first-
difference operator. In a single-currency peg to the euro, the euro-yen exchange rate
should have a coefficient equal to one, and any other exchange rate should have a
coefficient of zero. In a basket peg, the coefficients of the currencies making up the
basket should sum to one. If the government operates a crawling peg, with a steady
devaluation rate of x% per month, the value of x can be estimated from the intercept
term in the regression.
Where this regression covers the twelve months of a calendar year, as in Bleaney
and Tian (2017, 2020), the precise procedure is as follows. The classification is based
on the root mean square error (RMSE) of this regression, which we shall call Regres-
sion A. To allow for the possibility of one parity change per year, Bleaney and Tian
(2017) estimate 12 extra regressions, each with a dummy variable equal to one in one
month only added to Regression A. Call these regressions B(1) to B(12). If none of the
dummy variables is statistically significant enough, Regressions B(1) to B(12) are
ignored, and that country-year is coded a Fix if RMSE <0.01, and a Float otherwise.
If any of the dummy variables is significant enough, the B regression with the most
significant dummy variable becomes the focus of attention.2 If the RMSE <0.01 in the
chosen B regression, that country-year is coded as a Peg with a Parity Change, and
otherwise a Float. We impose two exceptions to this rule, however. (1) If the estimated
parity change is very small (< ±0.02), we treat it as a movement within an unchanged
band rather than a shift in the central rate, and the observation is coded a Fix. (2) Since
revaluations are in practice rare, except where one is known to have occurred, if the
estimated parity change is a revaluation of >0.02, this is assumed to be spurious, and
the B regressions are ignored, the coding instead being based on Regression A.3 This
classification is available up to 2019.
4 3Some Preliminary Issues
4.1 The Time Span of the Regression
In choosing the time span of the regression used for measuring exchange rate flexibil-
ity, there is clearly a trade-off between accuracy and the possibility of regime change.
With a longer time span, the regression has more degrees of freedom, but it is more
likely that there has been a regime change during the period. To address this issue we
consider regressions of length 18 and 24 months as well as twelve months, with the
2 Bleaney and Tian (2017) suggest an F-statistic >30 for the addition of the dummy variable as the critical
value.
3 We treat Germany 1983 and China 2005 as genuine parity changes.
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number of B regressions estimated being correspondingly increased. To be absolutely
clear, the RMSE attributed to the year 2019 is based on January to December 2019 in
the 12-month case, July 2018 to December 2019 in the 18-month case, and January
2018 to December 2019 in the 24-month case.
When applied on a 12-month basis for a calendar year, as in Bleaney and Tian (2017,
2020), the degrees of freedom in this regression are nine in the case where no parity
change is identified (twelve observations and three regressors), and only eight when
there is a parity change. This is reduced further in the small number of cases when
potential anchor currencies other than the US dollar and the euro are added. It is possible
that this small number of degrees of freedom biases the estimated RMSE downwards
(since as the degrees of freedom approach zero, so does the RMSE). It is also likely that
the volatility of a floating currency varies considerably from year to year, and that a more
consistent estimate would be obtained from a longer regression. On the other hand, a
regime switch during the period biases the measure upwards (Bleaney and Tian 2020),
and a longer regression increases the chance of a regime switch.
To address this issue, we compare the results for different regression lengths for a
number of currencies. Table 1 show some statistics for six currencies that were known
to be freely floating in the years 2000 to 2019, so there is no regime change issue. For
each country, the RMSE from eq. (1) is shown for a regression of 12 months (January
of year T to December of year T), eighteen months (July of year T-1 to December of
year T) and 24 months (January of year T-1 to December of year T). Table 1 provides
the mean RMSE for each country over these twenty years, together with its standard
deviation.
Table 1 The effects of the regression span on the RMSE for selected countries 2000 to 2019
Country 24 months 18 months 12 months
Mean
United States 2.03 2.05 1.93
United Kingdom 1.75 1.74 1.75
Canada 2.13 2.12 2.07
Japan 2.27 2.25 2.20
Australia 2.35 2.27 2.27
New Zealand 2.74 2.66 2.64
Standard Deviation
United States 0.507 0.546 0.600
United Kingdom 0.525 0.641 0.659
Canada 0.630 0.651 0.733
Japan 0.644 0.718 0.885
Australia 0.417 0.510 0.732
New Zealand 0.550 0.622 0.910
The statistics are the mean and standard deviations of the RMSEs, both multiplied by 100, for the years 2000
to 2019 derived from estimating Eq. (1) over 24-month, 18-month and 12-month horizons, as described in the
text
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The mean shows a slight tendency to increase, the maximum being about 5 %,
between the 12-month regression and the 24-month one. This suggests that the
downward bias from the relatively small degrees of freedom in the 12-month regression
is quite limited. On the other hand, the differences in standard deviations are much
more marked. The reduction in the standard deviation in the 24-month regression
compared with the 12-month regression is about 14% for Canada, about 15% for the
US and the UK, and more than 25% for Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This
provides a strong indication that a longer regression is better, in the sense of producing
more consistent results from period to period, so long as one can be sure that the regime
has not changed during the period.
4.2 Tight and Loose Pegs
Although we have suggested that an RMSE of less than 0.01 should define a peg, there
is a considerable preponderance of pegs with very small RMSEs (< 0.001). In this
section we investigate whether these Tight Pegs, as we label them, tend to be signif-
icantly different from Loose Pegs (RMSE between 0.001 and 0.01). For instance, are
they more likely to be single-currency pegs? This seems likely to be the case because of
the transparency of a single-currency peg (it is extremely easy for agents to check
whether the announced regime is being adhered to), and also because Loose Pegs may
include heavily managed floats that aim only to keep the exchange rate within a certain
range, as well as committed peggers.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function of the size of the largest
exchange rate coefficient in each regression for Tight and Loose Pegs separately. In
most cases this is just the larger of the euro and US dollar coefficients. For single-
currency pegs, this statistic should be very close to one, whereas for basket pegs or for
floats that are very tightly managed it will tend to be rather smaller, because of the
weight attached to other currencies. In Fig. 1, the percentile is on the vertical axis and
the statistic is on the horizontal axis. For Tight Pegs (1901 cases), the cumulative
distribution is very close to being a vertical line at one, indicating virtually 100%
single-currency pegs. For Loose Pegs (1850 cases), the picture is much more varied: the
25th percentile is 0.647, and the 50th percentile is 0.921, which suggests that only
about half of Loose Pegs are single-currency pegs or something very close to it.4
5 The Volatility of International Reserves and the Exchange Rate
Regime
There has been little empirical examination of the relationship between the variability
of reserves and of exchange rates, and the overall picture is unclear. Calvo and Reinhart
(2002, Fig. 1) focus on the proportion of months in which reserves increase or decrease
by more than 2.5%, and find that this proportion is much the same over different types
of exchange rate regime in a sample of 39 countries from January 1970 to November
1999. They interpret this as widespread “fear of floating” (i.e. fear of an independent
4 The figures are based on the 24-month regressions (results for 18 months and 12 months are very similar).
Currency unions are counted once only. For more data, see Appendix Table 9.
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float without intervention to manage the exchange rate), but an alternative interpretation
might be that pegs do not have EMP ratios as low as expected for the reasons given
above. Ahmad and Pentecost (2020) examine a relatively small sample of eight African
countries from 1970 to 2019 and use a similar statistical approach, based on the
proportion of monthly exchange rate and reserve movements that exceed a certain
threshold (±1% or ± 2.5%). They find that the proportion of the time that the exchange
rate movement exceeds either of these thresholds is similar between pegged and
floating regimes, but that reserve movements exceed the thresholds more often, not
less often, under floating, which seems in direct contradiction to the predictions of EMP
theory.
In this study, we use a large cross-country sample of monthly data between 1980 and
2019 to investigate the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and reserve
variability.
We first take a look inside the regressions used to generate our measure of exchange
rate flexibility. If we imagine a government whose policy is to keep its currency (the
peso) within a certain band of ±x% about a fixed central rate to the US dollar, then in
our regressions the fitted value of the log change in pesos per yen will equal the log
change in dollars per yen, and the residual will represent a depreciation in the peso
relative to its central rate against the dollar. If the government is intervening in the
foreign exchange market, that will be reflected in the change in reserves. The theory of
EMP predicts that intervention to keep the exchange rate within the ±x% band will tend
to take the form of sales of foreign currency when the exchange rate is depreciating
within the band and purchases when it is appreciating. We therefore investigate the
Fig. 1 The cumulative distribution of the largest exchange rate coefficient for pegs. Note: based on 24-month
regressions
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correlation between the residuals in each month of the regression and the change in the
log of reserves. For each country-year observation this generates a correlation coeffi-
cient which, according to EMP theory, should be negative when the authorities are
intervening to stabilise the exchange rate (since a depreciation is represented by a
positive residual). We investigate the distribution of this correlation coefficient for all
observations other than tight pegs, which are excluded because the exchange rate
variation is too small. The data on reserves are from IMF Financial Statistics and
exclude gold. They are denominated in US dollars. Excluding gold takes out the effects
of fluctuations in the price of gold, which would change total reserves without
representing any intervention in the foreign exchange market. Excluding gold does
however misrepresent intervention in months where gold is bought or sold in exchange
for foreign exchange reserves, as happens occasionally.
Table 2 gives some data about the distribution of this correlation across the whole
sample (excluding tight pegs), for the 12-month, 18-month and 24-month regressions
and for different ranges of exchange rate flexibility. The mean and the median
correlations are −0.078 and − 0.087 respectively for the 12-month regressions, −0.079
and − 0.088 for the 18-month regressions, and − 0.084 and − 0.090 respectively for the
24-month regressions. These numbers are all significantly different from zero, so there
is evidence of the expected negative correlation, although the percentiles indicate that
Table 2 Correlation between exchange rate depreciation and reserve accumulation
12-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
0.001≤RMSE<0.01 2032 −0.058 −0.958 0.945 −0.440 −0.268 −0.062 0.149 0.343
0.01≤RMSE<0.02 936 −0.105 −0.930 0.926 −0.493 −0.323 −0.123 0.093 0.310
RMSE>0.02 979 −0.092 −0.944 0.926 −0.546 −0.335 −0.104 0.135 0.364
Total (RMSE≥0.001) 3947 −0.078 −0.958 0.945 −0.480 −0.299 −0.087 0.133 0.344
18-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
0.001≤RMSE<0.01 1933 −0.064 −0.960 0.678 −0.382 −0.235 −0.069 0.102 0.258
0.01≤RMSE<0.02 997 −0.093 −0.917 0.908 −0.445 −0.275 −0.110 0.089 0.255
RMSE>0.02 1110 −0.093 −0.854 0.930 −0.476 −0.294 −0.109 0.088 0.298
Total (RMSE≥0.001) 4040 −0.079 −0.960 0.930 −0.424 −0.257 −0.088 0.095 0.264
24-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
0.001≤RMSE<0.01 1849 −0.067 −0.962 0.807 −0.349 −0.212 −0.068 0.075 0.221
0.01≤RMSE<0.02 1054 −0.109 −0.890 0.910 −0.421 −0.274 −0.109 0.037 0.192
RMSE>0.02 1216 −0.088 −0.879 0.862 −0.422 −0.282 −0.102 0.079 0.245
Total (RMSE≥0.001) 4119 −0.084 −0.962 0.910 −0.387 −0.248 −0.090 0.070 0.225
The figures in each row relate to the distribution of the correlation between the regression residual (which
represents exchange rate appreciation) and the change in the log of reserves over the 12, 18 or 24 months of
the regression for the sample with RMSE in the range indicated for that row. The RMSE precision cut-off is
0.0001. Exchange rate: Domestic Currency Units per Numeraire Currency. For example the first row refers to
the 2032 12-month regressions where the RMSE was between 0.001 and 0.01. The cases of RMSE<0.001 are
omitted because the residuals are too small. p10, p25…: 10th, 25th,… percentile of the correlation coefficient.
Mean and median are shown in bold
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the correlation is negative in only about two-thirds of cases, and this tends to be true
over the whole range of RMSE. Moreover one might expect the correlations to be more
negative at the less flexible end of the spectrum, where EMP theory would predict that
intervention would be more intense. This is not the case, however. The correlations are
always less negative, not more negative, on average for pegs (RMSE <0.01) than for
RMSE ≥0.01, and the difference is highly statistically significant (the median is
between −0.06 and − 0.07 for Loose Pegs, and between −0.10 and − 0.11 for floats).
This is consistent with the argument that credible pegs need little intervention to keep
the exchange rate within the announced range.
Next we turn to the question of the relationship between the variability of exchange rates
and of reserves. The issue is whether the standard deviation of the log of reserves over a
given period varies negatively and systematically with the degree of exchange rate
flexibility over the same period, as EMP theory suggests. If there is less exchange rate
flexibility, does there tend to be more reserve variability, either across the whole spectrum
of regimes or, as we have suggested, perhaps only at themore flexible end of the spectrum?
Table 3 provides some relevant statistics. Results for 12-month, 18-month and 24-
month regressions are all shown, but they all present a similar picture. Using the 24-
month regression results (the last row in each panel of Table 3), we can see that there is
not a monotonic relationship between exchange rate flexibility and the standard
Table 3 Distribution of the standard deviation of the log of reserves
count mean min Max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
RMSE<0.001
12 m-Window 2359 0.095 0.000 0.526 0.022 0.039 0.066 0.113 0.201
18 m-Window 2293 0.095 0.000 0.524 0.024 0.041 0.067 0.114 0.197
24 m-Window 2236 0.099 0.000 0.528 0.026 0.044 0.071 0.117 0.208
0.001≤RMSE<0.01
12 m-Window 2022 0.078 0.000 0.520 0.019 0.032 0.055 0.092 0.167
18 m-Window 1922 0.079 0.000 0.529 0.021 0.034 0.056 0.092 0.166
24 m-Window 1840 0.081 0.002 0.528 0.022 0.035 0.058 0.095 0.163
0.01≤RMSE<0.02
12 m-Window 930 0.066 0.003 0.448 0.015 0.024 0.045 0.079 0.137
18 m-Window 991 0.070 0.003 0.422 0.016 0.026 0.049 0.088 0.149
24 m-Window 1046 0.071 0.003 0.507 0.018 0.029 0.054 0.089 0.146
RMSE>0.02
12 m-Window 966 0.096 0.000 0.518 0.018 0.032 0.060 0.122 0.231
18 m-Window 1095 0.100 0.000 0.533 0.020 0.033 0.063 0.131 0.229
24 m-Window 1194 0.106 0.002 0.531 0.021 0.036 0.070 0.147 0.250
Whole sample
12-Window 6277 0.085 0.000 0.526 0.019 0.033 0.058 0.104 0.188
18-Window 6301 0.087 0.000 0.533 0.020 0.035 0.060 0.106 0.189
24-Window 6316 0.091 0.000 0.531 0.021 0.037 0.063 0.110 0.195
Both RMSE and the standard deviation of the log of reserves are trimmed by 2% at the top end. “p10” is the
tenth percentile
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deviation of reserve changes. For RMSE<0.001, the median reserve variability is
0.071, which is higher than for RMSE in the range 0.001 to 0.01 (0.058) or 0.01 to
0.02 (0.054), but very similar to RMSE greater than 0.02 (0.070). The picture is much
the same for 12-month and 18-month regressions.
Before discussing this further, it is useful to construct a measure of EMP as the
standardised sum of exchange rate flexibility and reserve variability, and to investigate
the distribution of this variable as well as the relationship between its two components.
We compare the flexibility index described in Section Two, which was based purely on
exchange rates, to a flexibility index based on the ratio of the two components of EMP.
We construct a bivariate index of exchange rate flexibility in country j in year t
(BFLEXjt), after normalising the variables to have the same standard deviation over the
whole sample, as follows. Define EMP (EMPjt) as the sum of ZEjt and ZRjt, where ZEjt
is 100 times the RMSE and ZRjt is 100 times the standard deviation of the log of
reserves (SDR), multiplied by the ratio of the sample standard deviation of RMSE (Y)
to the sample standard deviation of SDR (X) (both 2% trimmed at the upper end):
EMPjt ¼ ZEjt þ ZRjt ¼ 100*RMSEjt þ 100* YX
 
SDRjt ð1Þ
In this case the value of Y is 0.018 and ofX is 0.087, so the standardisation coefficient 0.211.
Eq. (1) keeps the minimum possible value of EMP at zero. The bivariate index of flexibility
is the percentage of EMP represented by ZE rather than by ZR, or in other words howmuch
of EMP variability can be attributed to exchange rates rather than reserves:




Table 4 presents some data about EMP and BFLEX in relation to different degrees of
exchange rate variability. EMP is only slightly larger for RMSE between 0.001 and
0.01 than for RMSE <0.001 (2.23 compared with 2.10 using the 24-month regression
window), but jumps to 2.97 for RMSE between 0.01 and 0.02, and then more than
doubles to 6.44 for RMSE >0.02. The pattern for BFLEX is rather the opposite of that,
with the smallest differences between the two highest categories of RMSE. When
RMSE is very small (< 0.001), BFLEX is also very small (1.0% using a 24-month
window), so there is very little difference between them for tight pegs. The average of
BFLEX for looser pegs (RMSE between 0.001 and 0.01) is 29.6%, rising to 55.9% for
RMSE between 0.01 and 0.02 and 68.6% for RMSE over 0.02.
Table 5 shows the correlation between RMSE and BFLEX across the sample. The
correlation is very similar whatever the length of the regression window, and is 0.66 for the
whole sample (using the 24-month figure). Within the category of loose pegs (RMSE
between 0.001 and 0.01) it is still quite high, at 0.53, but it falls to 0.24 for RMSE in the
range 0.01 to 0.02, and to only 0.15 for RMSE above 0.02. In tight pegs, where RMSE is
very close to zero, the correlation is only 0.32. The relatively high value for the whole
sample reflects the fact that if RMSE is very small, so is BFLEX, as Table 4 shows.
By regressing ZR on ZE in a quantile regression, we can examine the relationship
between reserve variability and exchange rate flexibility across the whole spectrum of
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RMSE. Using the data from the 24-month regressions, Fig. 2 shows the point estimates
of the coefficient at each decile of the distribution of RMSE, together with a 95%
confidence interval (the shaded area); the OLS coefficient of 0.133, which has a t-
statistic of 4.77, is shown as a horizontal line. The point estimate in Fig. 2 increases
steadily from effectively zero at the first decile to 0.3 at the ninth decile, and the
coefficient is significantly different from zero from the third decile upwards.5
Thus the picture we get is that there is no negative correlation between reserve
variability and exchange rate flexibility in pegged exchange rates, and a positive
correlation in more flexible regimes.
Finally, there is the question of whether BFLEX is a superior measure of
exchange rate flexibility to RMSE. There is no straightforward way to address
this question. We might compare them in some way with other exchange rate
classification schemes, such as those of Klein and Shambaugh (2010) or
Ilzetzki et al. (2017), and interpret greater agreement as greater accuracy, but
to the extent that these other schemes are based on a statistical algorithm (as
they essentially are), a greater degree of agreement would simply mean greater
similarity between the algorithms applied, and not necessarily greater accuracy.
There is a stronger case for treating the IMF de facto classification scheme as
some sort of arbiter, since that is based on the judgement of informed observers
at the time (according to guidelines that are similar for all countries) and is not
5 The graphs for the 18-month and 12-month regressions are similar. The actual quantile regressions are
reported in the Appendix.
Table 4 EMP and a bivariate exchange rate flexibility index
EMP Exchange rate % of EMP
(BFLEX)
12 m-Window
1: RMSE<0.001 1.803 1.251
2: 0.001<=RMSE<0.01 1.982 32.281
3: 0.01<=RMSE<0.02 2.702 60.700
4: RMSE>0.02 5.879 72.041
18 m-Window
1: RMSE<0.001 1.938 1.122
2: 0.001<=RMSE<0.01 2.124 30.822
3: 0.01<=RMSE<0.02 2.859 57.396
4: RMSE>0.02 6.135 70.224
24 m-Window
1: RMSE<0.001 2.102 1.041
2: 0.001<=RMSE<0.01 2.233 29.553
3: 0.01<=RMSE<0.02 2.965 55.902
4: RMSE>0.02 6.438 68.554
Mean values are shown. EMP = 100*[RMSE + a*SD(dlnReserves)], where a = standardisation coefficient.
BFLEX = 10000*RMSE/(EMP)
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purely statistical, and also distinguishes between managed and free floats.
Moreover it does take reserve movements into account, at least in deciding
whether to classify a float as a free float or a managed one. The criteria for
identifying a free float in the IMF classification have been clarified in recent
years, having up to 2008 essentially relied on judgement (Habermeier et al.
2009).6
Of course in comparing the IMF classification with our flexibility measures,
we are comparing a system of aggregating regimes into a small number of
categories with a continuous measure. The procedure that we adopt is to
examine how the different categories in the IMF classification are distributed
across the flexibility indices.
The results are shown in Table 6. The top half of the table refers to RMSE and the
bottom half to BFLEX; for each measure Table 6 shows, first, the count of the number
of (a) IMF pegs and bands and (b) IMF floats of that appear in each decile of the
distribution of RMSE and BFLEX, using the 24-month window results; and then
similar information for a further disaggregation of the IMF classification.
Pegs represent 67.0% of the IMF sample, managed floats 22.6% and free floats
10.4%. Using the 24-month regressions, we find that 89.8% and 89.6% respectively of
IMF pegs fall below the 60th percentile of RMSE and BFLEX. Moving up to the 70th
percentile, these percentages fall to 84.5 and 84.4% respectively. This is a relatively
high degree of agreement with the IMF classification, compared with that between
other pairs of classification schemes, as shown for example in Eichengreen and Razo-
Garcia (2013) and Bleaney et al. (2017).7 The similarity of the numbers for RMSE and
BFLEX suggests that there is no advantage in using information on reserve variability
to identify exchange rate pegs. Above the 70th percentile, where both RMSE and
BFLEX suggest some type of float, there is some divergence in the distribution of IMF
pegs: for RMSE, 162 out of 3858 (4.2%) appear in the highest decile, whereas for
BFLEX the figure is 97 out of 3858 (2.5%). Since the proportion of pegs above the
6 The new system is described as follows in Habermeier et al. (2009, p. 8): “As noted, once a de facto
exchange rate arrangement has been identified as floating, it can be further qualified as free floating if there has
been no intervention over the past six months, with the exception of limited intervention to address disorderly
market conditions. If IMF staff responsible for the classification do not have sufficient information and data to
verify whether this criterion has been met, the arrangement is classified as floating. Data and its availability,
rather than subjective judgment, thus play the key role in assigning a country to the free floating category.”
7 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2016) report an agreement rate of 62.7% with the IMF de facto classification
over the period 1974–2013, using three categories: fixed, intermediate and floating.
Table 5 Correlation between RMSE and BFLEX
Regression length: 12 months 18 months 24 months
Whole sample 0.671 0.667 0.661
RMSE<0.001 0.361 0.351 0.324
0.001≤RMSE<0.01 0.525 0.528 0.538
0.01≤RMSE<0.02 0.246 0.223 0.245
RMSE≥0.02 0.147 0.139 0.149
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70th percentile is virtually identical for RMSE and BFLEX, more pegs appear in the
80th and 90th percentiles for BFLEX than for RMSE.
On the other hand, neither flexibility index seems particularly good at
separating free floats from managed floats. Of IMF free floats, only 141 out
of 597 (23.6%) appear in the top decile of RMSE, and 198 (33.2%) in the top
decile of BFLEX. Clearly, BFLEX is somewhat better at picking up free floats
(although if we take the top two deciles instead of just the top one, RMSE
scores 351 (58.8%) and BFLEX 346 (58.0%)). The other 40 + % of IMF free
floats are spread further down the distribution, with 28 (4.7%) for RMSE and
48 (8.2%) for BFLEX even below the 60th percentile. Thus free floats tend to
be higher up the ranking than managed floats in BFLEX as opposed to RMSE.
Both measures have the problem that the natural variation of a freely floating
exchange rate differs across countries, being particularly large for countries with
low ratios of trade to GDP, which reflects features such as country size,
population density, remoteness from trading partners and landlockedness as
well as trade policy (Bleaney and Francisco 2010; Bravo-Ortega and di
Giovanni 2006).
It is interesting to compare the frequency with which countries appear in the
top decile of the two flexibility indices. The top half of Table 7 lists the
countries which appear in the top decile of BFLEX in at least seven years
more than in the top decile of RMSE, and the bottom half lists the countries
which appear in the top decile of RMSE in at least seven years more than in
the top decile of BFLEX.
Fig. 2 Quantile regression results of ZR on ZE (24-month regressions)
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There is a distinct difference between the two lists. High-income and middle-income
countries appear more frequently in the top decile of BFLEX, with the United States
(29 years compared to 6) and Japan (33 years compared to 5) being especially
prominent. Developing countries appear more frequently in the top decile of RMSE,
with sub-Saharan African countries making up eight of the thirteen in the bottom half of
Table 7. This suggests that there is much more intervention in the foreign exchange
market amongst floating currencies in the latter group of countries, and that the former
group are much closer to an independent float.
Although Fig. 2 shows a positive correlation between exchange rate flexibility
and reserve volatility throughout the distribution, it is possible that the negative
correlation posited by EMP theory would emerge if we controlled for the “natural”
variation of different currencies that would be observed if they were all freely
floating. Accordingly Table 8 shows the results of a regression of 12-month
exchange rate flexibility on reserve volatility, per capita GDP relative to the United
States, inflation, trade openness and land area per capita (a proxy for likely
specialisation in commodity exports). Per capita GDP is either at PPP (columns
1 and 3) or in constant US$ (columns 2 and 4), which is available for a slightly
Table 6 Count of IMF Exchange Rate Regimes, by RMSE and BFLEX Deciles (24-month windows)
Percentile: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total
Flexibility measure: RMSE
All Pegs 574 568 559 529 463 412 301 167 123 162 3858
All Floats 3 9 16 47 113 164 275 409 453 414 1903
Hard Pegs 251 292 287 73 18 6 10 1 0 3 941
Conv’l Pegs 322 275 272 307 244 201 138 57 71 84 1971
Other Pegs 1 1 0 149 201 205 153 109 52 75 946
Man’d Floats 3 8 15 46 106 146 198 268 243 273 1306
Free Floats 0 1 1 1 7 18 77 141 210 141 597
Total 577 577 575 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 5761
Flexibility measure: BFLEX
All Pegs 572 564 566 503 479 414 309 201 153 97 3858
All Floats 5 12 10 73 97 162 267 375 423 479 1903
Hard Pegs 245 312 281 51 18 16 10 5 3 0 941
Conv’l Pegs 326 252 284 278 258 205 161 82 70 55 1971
Other Pegs 1 0 1 174 203 193 138 114 80 42 946
Man’d Floats 5 12 8 72 81 132 192 252 275 281 1306
Free Floats 0 0 2 1 16 30 75 123 148 198 597
Total 577 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 5761
The categories are based on the IMF de facto classification, for details of which see Habermeier et al. (2009).
Hard peg: no separate legal tender or currency board arrangement. Conventional peg: peg to a single currency
or basket, not necessarily announced, with a deviation from central rate of less than ±1% over six months.
Other peg: either a crawling peg, or a horizontal peg with deviation from central rate of ±1% or more over six
months. Free Float: a floating currency with only occasional intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Managed Float: the residual category
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larger sample. Columns 1 and 2 are pooled OLS regressions, and the main features
are that exchange rate flexibility increases with inflation and decreases with trade
openness and per capita GDP. For completeness, Columns 3 and 4 show the same
regressions with year and country dummies; not surprisingly the variables that have
Table 7 Frequency of countries’ appearance in the top deciles of RMSE and BFLEX
Appearance in top decile of BFLEX 7+ times more frequently than in top decile of
RMSE
Country RMSE frequency BFLEX frequency
United States 6 29












South Korea 5 20
Thailand 3 14
Poland 6 14
Appearance in top decile of BFLEX 7+ times less frequently than in top decile of RMSE
Country RMSE frequency BFLEX frequency
Iceland 10 3
New Zealand 10 2
Argentina 12 5





Sierra Leone 11 0
Tanzania 8 1
Zambia 16 6
Papua New Guinea 8 0
Romania 10 3
Based on 24-month regressions. The table shows the number of years between 1980 and 2018 that the country
appears in the top decile of the flexibility index indicated. RMSE -exchange rate flexibility index; BFLEX –
flexibility index based on exchange rate and reserve variability. Countries are listed in order of IFS code
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relatively little time variation within each country (trade openness, per capita GDP)
lose their statistical significance. The important point, however, is that the coeffi-
cient of the reserve volatility variable is still significantly positive, contrary to the
predictions of EMP theory.
6 Conclusions
Most currencies are managed to some degree. The argument that exchange rate
classifications should be based on exchange rate flexibility relative to reserve
variability therefore has a natural appeal, because it captures to what degree the
exchange rate is being managed by intervention. However, there are some
significant problems in using this “EMP ratio” to identify exchange rate pegs
and bands. The marginal cost of exchange rate variability suddenly becomes
Table 8 Explaining exchange rate flexibility for floating currencies
Dependent variable: 12-month exchange rate flexibility (ZE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)









ZR 0.179* 0.160** 0.226** 0.183**
(1.87) (2.15) (2.27) (2.20)
GDPpc −0.010 −0.005** −0.019 −0.004
(−1.60) (−2.27) (−0.67) (−0.39)
CPI Inflation (%) 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.072***
(3.96) (3.93) (5.05) (5.34)
Trade Openness −0.414*** −0.419*** −0.311 −0.288
(−2.85) (−3.17) (−0.72) (−0.68)
Ln (Land area pc) −0.031 −0.055 −5.288 −4.032
(−0.05) (−0.09) (−1.44) (−0.83)
Constant 1.861*** 1.898*** 1.390** 0.600
(9.33) (10.39) (2.08) (0.74)
Country Dummies No No Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
No. of Countries 96 97 96 97
Observations 1539 1639 1539 1639
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.15
RMSE 1.667 1.679 1.407 1.435
The dependent variable is 12-month exchange rate flexibility (ZE). Sample: all floats identified by the IMF de
facto classification 1980–2019. Country-years with consumer price inflation >40% omitted. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***,**,* coefficient significantly
different from zero at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. ZR: normalised 12-month reserve volatility. GDP per capita
is ratio of US GDP per capita in same year. Trade openness: (exports + imports)/GDP
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very large at a certain threshold that represents movement outside the an-
nounced band, because the concept implicitly assumes continuity in the mar-
ginal cost of the two components of the EMP ratio, and there is a sharp
discontinuity in the marginal cost of exchange rate flexibility at the boundary
of the peg. This creates a clustering of observations with similarly low ex-
change rate flexibility but considerable variation in reserve volatility, thus
making the EMP ratio rather uninformative. This drawback does not apply to
the issue of distinguishing more from less tightly managed floats, since the
assumed continuity of marginal cost is likely to hold. This implies that the
EMP ratio may be more useful in identifying how tightly managed a float is
than in identifying a peg.
There has been relatively little research on the behaviour of reserves in
relation to exchange rate movements. We have investigated the issue for a
global sample of countries from 1980 to 2019. First of all we investigated
whether month-to-month reserve accumulation is negatively correlated with
exchange rate depreciation, as would be expected if reserves were being used
for the purpose of exchange rate stabilisation. It turns out that this is the case
in a comfortable majority of country-years (about two-thirds). On the other
hand, the correlation is weaker rather than stronger for the least flexible
regimes, contrary to what might be expected.
We then examined the relationship between the variabilities of exchange
rates and reserves over periods of 12, 18 and 24 months, and found that the
correlation tends to be positive rather than negative, particularly at the more
flexible end of the spectrum. So regimes with more stable exchange rates do
not tend to have greater variability of international reserves. In all exchange
rate regimes, the distribution of 12-month reserve volatility is highly skewed,
with a long upper tail. Finally we constructed a flexibility index as the ratio of
exchange rate flexibility to the sum of exchange rate flexibility and
standardised reserve variability, and investigated whether this bivariate flexibil-
ity index matched the IMF de facto regime classification better than the
exchange rate flexibility component alone. With respect to the splits between
pegs or bands and some type of floating, taking reserves into account made
very little difference: nearly 90% of IMF pegs (which represent about two-
thirds of the sample) lie below the 60th percentile of either flexibility index.
This finding supports the view that reserve volatility does not add any useful
information for identifying a peg.
However, regimes classed by the IMF as free floats rather than managed ones (just
over 10% of the sample) were more likely to be in the top 10% of the bivariate
flexibility index than in the top 10% of one based purely on exchange rates, which
suggests that a lack of reserve variability helps to identify freely floating currencies.
This is consistent with the idea that the EMP ratio adds value as an indicator of the
extent to which a float is managed. On the other hand, when we estimated a model of
the volatility of floating exchange rates as a function of control variables such as
inflation and trade openness, to test whether greater reserve volatility was negatively
correlated with exchange rate flexibility after controlling for an economy’s “natural”
exchange rate volatility, the coefficient of reserve volatility remained significantly
positive, rather than negative as predicted in the EMP approach.
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Table 9 Maximum exchange rate coefficient for Tight and Loose Pegs
12-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Tight Peg 1955 0.995 0.283 1.204 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Loose Peg 2000 0.887 0.233 67.614 0.468 0.651 0.920 1.004 1.071
Total 3955 0.940 0.233 67.614 0.572 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.021
18-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Tight Peg 1901 0.997 0.420 1.038 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Loose Peg 1917 0.840 0.246 7.470 0.472 0.644 0.916 0.998 1.045
Total 3818 0.918 0.246 7.470 0.577 0.912 1.000 1.000 1.009
24-Month Window
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Tight Peg 1846 0.999 0.419 1.204 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Loose Peg 1850 0.840 0.255 23.727 0.464 0.647 0.921 0.997 1.030
Total 3696 0.919 0.255 23.727 0.571 0.918 1.000 1.000 1.007
The table gives statistics for the distribution of the largest exchange rate coefficient in the regression for Tight Pegs
(RMSE<0.001) and Loose Pegs (0.001<=RMSE<0.01); p10 denotes the tenth percentile of the distribution
Table 10 Distribution of BFLEX for different ranges of RMSE_trm02
count mean min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
RMSE<0.001
12-Window 2359 1.251 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.719
18-Window 2293 1.122 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.186
24-Window 2236 1.041 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.018
0.001<=RMSE<0.01
12-Window 2022 32.281 1.456 100.000 9.931 17.496 29.427 44.183 58.985
18-Window 1922 30.822 1.339 100.000 9.901 16.694 27.947 42.075 56.170
24-Window 1840 29.553 1.612 94.554 9.804 16.288 26.441 39.971 53.799
0.01<=RMSE<0.02
12-Window 930 60.700 11.974 96.832 34.382 46.775 62.432 75.822 84.255
18-Window 991 57.396 10.541 95.934 31.130 44.034 57.935 71.143 81.860
24-Window 1046 55.902 11.827 95.228 30.062 42.815 56.084 70.221 79.955
RMSE>0.02
12-Window 966 72.041 19.829 100.000 48.815 62.010 75.095 84.812 90.599
18-Window 1095 70.224 17.708 100.000 46.670 59.353 73.140 83.054 89.340
24-Window 1194 68.554 16.345 98.939 45.092 56.883 71.348 81.646 87.708
Total
12-Window 6277 30.949 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.003 23.064 57.233 78.506
18-Window 6301 31.041 0.000 100.000 0.001 0.003 24.236 56.530 78.045
24-Window 6316 31.196 0.000 100.000 0.001 0.002 25.111 56.484 77.311
RMSE_trm02: exchange rate flexibility (top 2% trimmed); BFLEX: bivariate flexibility index (see text). “12-
window” denotes results using a 12-month regression window
Appendix
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Table 11 Correlation between BFLEX and RMSE_trm02
All RMSE<0.001 0.001<=RMSE<0.01 0.01<=RMSE<0.02 RMSE>0.02
12-Window 0.671 0.361 0.525 0.246 0.147
18-Window 0.667 0.351 0.528 0.223 0.139
24-Window 0.661 0.324 0.538 0.245 0.149
See Notes to Appendix Table 10
Table 12 Simultaneous-quantile regression for ZR on ZE Dep. Var: ZR
12-Window 18-Window 24-Window
q10
ZE −0.005 −0.000 −0.004
(−0.672) (−0.010) (−0.460)
_cons 0.368*** 0.416*** 0.462***
(35.928) (37.729) (30.004)
q20
ZE −0.008 0.004 0.010
(−1.150) (0.522) (0.991)
_cons 0.545*** 0.607*** 0.667***
(52.395) (53.645) (46.046)
q30
ZE 0.006 0.018* 0.026***
(0.561) (1.648) (2.614)
_cons 0.705*** 0.781*** 0.854***
(47.691) (50.280) (68.599)
q40
ZE 0.013 0.048*** 0.052***
(1.179) (4.588) (4.974)
_cons 0.886*** 0.957*** 1.046***
(52.346) (72.931) (66.321)
q50
ZE 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.085***
(3.660) (5.109) (6.670)
_cons 1.067*** 1.166*** 1.250***
(68.534) (74.022) (70.028)
q60
ZE 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.120***
(4.946) (5.568) (5.308)
_cons 1.307*** 1.420*** 1.522***
(68.304) (64.962) (62.433)




ZE 0.097*** 0.142*** 0.192***
(4.611) (6.182) (7.895)
_cons 1.639*** 1.763*** 1.854***
(57.959) (59.698) (58.014)
q80
ZE 0.163*** 0.215*** 0.246***
(5.857) (8.607) (10.854)
_cons 2.156*** 2.289*** 2.428***
(49.373) (48.516) (52.659)
q90
ZE 0.199*** 0.273*** 0.313***
(4.731) (5.943) (9.159)
_cons 3.358*** 3.525*** 3.666***
(52.658) (48.442) (52.931)
N 6277 6301 6316
ZR, standardised reserve variability; ZE, exchange rate flexibility.
* ** *** 10% 5% 1%. Bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses
Fig. 3 Results from quantile regressions of standardised reserve variability on exchange rate flexibility using a
12-month regression window
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